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FOREWORD 
This "Information Service" has been initiated and established 
by the Chief of Naval Personnel for the benefit of officers unable to 
attend the Naval War College. 
In this and subsequent issues will be found selected articles of 
value to all officers. Many of these articles will be outstanding lec­
tures delivered at the Naval War College and other service 
institutions 
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SEA POWER IS WORLD POWER 
An article by 
Commander George H. Miller, U. S. Navy 
As the United States stands on the threshold of what may one 
day be known as her Golden Age it might be well for us to look back 
over the road which has led our country to its present position of 
world leadership. Today we are the most powerful nation on earth, 
and there is little doubt that much of the credit for this growth can 
be laid to our fortunate geographic position. Situated between 
two great oceans, the United States is unmistakably a maritime 
power. Our forefathers, who crossed the seas to found our na­
tion, were seafaring people. They derived their living from the 
sea, and it is because of the sea that our nation grew and pros­
pered. The seas have given us security and economic stability, 
and these two elements are wholly related, one to the other. 
As we grew, we enjoyed the tacit protection of the British 
Navy. And it was because of the maternalistic attitude, and pos­
sibly the preoccupation, of the British that we were permitted to 
use the seas without having to pay our way. In other words we 
were given a free ride by the British Navy. For example, we pro­
pounded the Monroe Doctrine and were able, by obtaining the sup­
port of the British, to make it stick. Later we built a great fleet of 
clipper ships without having to bear the expense of a huge navy to 
protect them. In World War I, we were able to fight an overseas 
war chiefly because the British Fleet was there to run interference 
for us. 
Between World War I and World War II we were able to 
build a tactical navy designed to defeat the Japanese Fleet in a 
Commander Miller is a member of the Staff of the President, 
Naval War College. 
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fleet action. During. this period all our talent was devoted to the 
problem of defeating the Japanese Fleet in the Pacific, while in 
the Atlantic our thinking went very little beyond the Neutrality 
Patrol. As for the rest -of the world, we let the British worry 
about that; So lo:p.g as the British looked out for things else-
where we did not have to think seriously about problems pf maritime 
strategy--or global strategy. 
Thus our navy was a tactical navy, superbly trained and, 
we believed, ready to fight. Fleet training and fleet readiness were 
given top priority. They were our primary· objectives in our peace-
time training for war. 
Today we face a different situation.. The British are un­
able to carry their former share of the load. We in the United 
States are finding it necessary to assume more and more of the 
responsibility for world stability. And so if anyone is going to 
do any serious thinking about the uses and implications of sea 
power it must be the United States. 
It is because of our unchallenged position as the dominant 
sea power that we are today the greatest power on the face of 
the earth. It is because of this control of the seas that we are 
able to exert our influence in most of the important areas of the 
earth. And in case of war sea power places at our disposal most 
of the resources, the populations, and the industrial capacity of the 
world. We need only look at the Globe to remind ourselves that 
wherever the oceans touch the shores, the United States exerts a 
powerful influence for world stability. Consequently, so long as 
we control the seas, our frontiers, unlike those of a land power, lie 
acrqss the seas rather than at our own borders. 
Now we are witnessing an amazing paradox. Here is a na­
tion, born and brought up by the sea, a nation which is today one 
2 
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of the greatest sea powers the world has ever known; and her 
people are beginning to forget it. Why has this happened? 
One reason for this apparent confusion of thought is the 
fact that we are in the midst of an industrial revolution. In the 
last hundred years, civilization has advanced further in the techni­
cal field than it has in all previous recorded history. We have 
moved so fast that our military thinking has not been able to 
keep pace with the development of new weapons. We are tend­
ing to become so preoccupied with the technical aspects of warfare 
that our strategic thinking suffers. 
In the midst of this technical advance, we find the British 
forced to relinquish their position as the dominant sea power. We 
in the Navy were just not ready for the task that was thereby 
handed to us. Up to this time, we had always been a tactical 
Navy, free to occupy ourselves with our own little problems, while 
the British worried about the rest of the world. Fleet training 
and fleet readiness have always taken priority over higher education 
in naval strategy. As a result, we do not have in our Navy or 
in our country today any sizeable group of recognized naval 
strategists. We have never really needed these strategic thinkers 
until now; and we just do not have them. 
We have a wealth of technical experts who have no equal 
in any other nation. We have aviation specialists, amphibious 
specialists, submarine specialists, anti-submarine specialists, atomic 
energy specialists, and electronic specialists, but we just do not have 
enough people with a clear understanding of sea power and mari­
time strategy. Without such understanding these many elements of 
military power cannot be properly integrated into a pattern of 
national security. 
Along with our rapid technical development there has grown 
up among our people a sincere desire to turn from considerations 
3 
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of national security to the more constructive pursuits of peace. 
There has been a natural tendency to look around for a simple 
formula by which our national security problems could be solved. 
Some have suggested that the simple solution to our problem lies 
in the large-scale use of the atomic bomb. We recognize in this 
proposal the theory of the blitzkrieg, the quick, easy victory idea, 
that has always seemed so attractive to the uninformed. It is 
the old land-power concept of the "putsch", which depends so 
much on being able to obtain the quick surrender of the enemy. 
But if the enemy fails to surrender according to plan, the blitz­
krieg fails, and the attacker is faced with a totally different kind of 
a war, a kind for which he is not prepared. He finds himself fight­
ing the kind of war the enemy wants to fight, and the result in 
this case could very well be final def eat. 
And thus today we are attempting to solve our national se,. 
curity problems through poorly conceived concepts, rather than 
through a clear understanding of geography and strategy. We as 
a nation are attempting to ignore the very existence of three­
quarters of the surface of the earth-the seas, by which we have 
grown to our present position of world power. 
The truth of the matter is that we in the Armed Forces have 
stood by while these unsound concepts were being pressed. We 
simply did not have the people who understood the significance 
of the seas to our national life well enough to spell it out for the 
American people. 
We can go even one step further. In some instances, we in 
the Navy have helped promote these false concepts. During the con­
fusion that followed the initial use of atomic weapons, there were 
those in our own service who came forward to assert that from now 
on wars would be fought exclusively below the surface of the seas, 
or in the skies. And there was one of our wartime captains who is 
4 
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reputed to have said, "I am retiring because there is no longer 
any need for a navy." 
As a result of our failure to keep our thinking abreast of 
new developments the American people are beginning to lose sight 
of the vital significance of the sea areas of the world to their na­
tional security and prosperity. There is a growing tendency to turn 
from the sea and to accept the far more costly security measures 
peculiar to land powers. Some current concepts, instead of wel­
coming and exploiting to the fullest the free, easy road of the sea, 
seek to avoid its use. Yet, by the very facts of geography we are 
a maritime power. To reach the rest of the world in peace or in 
war, we must first cross the seas; for others to reach us they, too, 
must first cross the seas. 
In peace and in war the maritime power holds a tremendous 
economic advantage over the land power. The significant phen­
omenon of sea power is that we can build a huge tub, or hull, 
and float it on the surface of the water; It floats by itself; it 
requires no power to keep it afloat. This huge tub can be filled 
with cargo-or bombs, or airplanes, or soldiers-and with relatively 
little power can be moved to almost any point on the surface of the 
earth. There are no rail or road beds to maintain, no mountains to 
cross, no tunnels to dig. And as our civilization continues to de­
velop more ways will be found to use this cheap, easy road of the 
sea. 
Water transportation is by far the most economical means 
of transportation known to Man. By conservative estimate it is 
two times as economical as land transportation and thirty-four times 
as economical as air transportation. To take a specific example, 
one oil company estimates that it costs twenty times as much to 
transport petroleum products by rail as it does by water. Thus the 
cost of transporting petroleum products by air would be over three 
5 
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hundred times the cost by water. When we realize that our overseas 
transportation during five years of the past war amounted to ap­
proximately 676 billion ton-miles and that about two thirds of this 
total consisted of petroleum products we can readily see the eco­
nomic advantage of gearing our war and peacetime transportation 
to the sea. 
War is fundamentally a problem of transportation, the prob­
lem of transporting weapons-whether they be in the form of 
bombs, projectiles or bayonets-to the point where they will exert 
the greatest influence on the enemy. It would therefore seem pru­
dent that we plan, in the event of war, to transport our weapons 
as close as possible to our objective by sea, shifting to more expen­
sive means of transportation only when sufficient resistance de­
velops to prevent further movement by water. By projecting our 
air forces and ground forces at the end of sea lines of communica­
tion a smaller percentage of the national wealth is expended for 
transportation. For every dollar expended for our military estab­
lishment we would thereby assure ourselves of more hitting power 
at the point of contact with the enemy. In order to assure our­
selves of the tremendous advantages inherent in water transporta­
tion it therefore seems reasonable that our primary national ob­
jective in peace or in war is to maintain control of the seas. Any 
threat to this control should be considered as the major threat to 
our national security. 
What steps are we taking to clarify our thinking on the 
subject of sea power? Even today there are few in our Navy, or 
in the country at large, who see the critical need for a serious 
study of sea power and naval strategy. There are few who real-
. ize that a basic understanding of sea power is a matter of grave 
concern to every citizen of the United States. For the day we as a 
nation relinquish our supremacy on the seas is the day we begin 
our decline. 
6 
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Today there are relatively fe:w in the Navy who fully un­
derstand the implications of sea power. Before we can carry this 
message to the other services and to the people of the United 
States we must first educate ourselves. Unless the study of sea 
power is pursued vigorously and continuously with the best minds 
available in the country we cannot expect to maintain our dominat­
ing position in the world. This is a matter of immediate concern 
to the people of the United States. The best talent and the best 
equipment in the country must be made available to work on the 
problem of maintaining our position on the seas. 
The study of sea power and naval strategy is an under­
taking that should be given the highest priority. It is a project as 
urgent as the study and development of anti-submarine warfare, 
guided missiles, or atomic energy. Unless our strategic thinking 
is the best in the world all the new weapons we are developing can­
not save us. 
The case for sea power was never so strong as it is today. 
It is the single factor governing our present position as a World 
Power. The implications of sea power for our future go far beyond 
anything we can now comprehend. We in the Navy must be the 
first to recognize and understand this fact. 
We Americans might also remind ourselves that it is not in­
evitable that the United States maintain indefinitely her present 
position of world supremacy; we are not immune to decadence. For 
even though our scientific progress has been nothing short of re­
markable, we are not a race of supermen. Nor are we specially en­
dowed with some supernatural immunity from human error. We as 
a nation are vulnerable to the same error, the same pitfalls as are 
other communities of human beings. 
7 
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History is filled with the epitaphs of nations which, though 
blessed with favorable maritime positions, chose to turn their backs 
on the sea. We hold in our own hands the destiny of our country; 
and in our minds lay the seeds of our own destruction. The quality 
of our strategic thinking today may well deter�ine whether the 
life of these United States will be measured in centuries-or in 
decades. 
8 
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THE ARMED FORCES AND PUBLIC INFORMATION 
IN WAR AND PEACE 
A lecture delivered by 
Mr. Erwin D. Canham 
at the Naval War College 
May 6, 1948 
It isn't really necessary to take much time to seek to prove 
the importance of public information and a sound public informa­
tion program. I don't know that we Americans have learned the 
significance of public information as quickly or perhaps even as 
completely as some of our enemies. A good deal has come to light 
in the last decade about public information and its uses-a good 
deal that is revealing and very important. As an illustration, the 
diary of the notorius Dr. Goebbels, which has quite recently been 
published, is filled with revealing tips as to the power of propa­
ganda. 
I shall seek throughout everything I have to say to make 
clear and to emphasize the great and profound difference between 
a public relations program in a democracy and one in a dictator­
ship. In a democracy one responds to the right of the people to 
know certain things, and the attitude is one of opportunity between 
the official and the public-while in a dictatorship public informa­
tion is used as an unscrupulous and ruthless tool of thought con­
trol. The fact that public information can be used as an extremely 
powerful weapon of thought control indicates that it is a subject 
which can no longer be safely ignored. Since dictatorships have · 
always recognized and used public information as a frankly con­
fessed weapon it behooves us to think it out more carefully and see 
Mr. Canham is Editor of the "Christian Science Monitor," and Vice 
President of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. 
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wherein a sound program of public relations is an important as­
set and a valuable instrument in attaining definite objectives. 
I mentioned Dr. Goebbels and his diary. Dr. Goebbels has 
an extreme sensitiveness to words. For example, shortly after 
Hitler came to power in Germany Dr. Goebbels saw to it that the 
word "assassination" never appeared in the German press. So 
fin(;lly drawn was this concept of propaganda and of thought con­
trol that Dr. Goebbels, as one of the great experts in the field, 
decided that the mere publication of the word "assassination" was 
contrary to the Nazi interest. 
Perhaps the greatest illustration of the use of public in­
formation as a powerful weapon is the illustration of the Soviet 
Union today. It is quite obvious that the Russians are afraid of 
information; they are afraid of any ideas, any set of facts which 
may, to any degree, challenge their approved doctrine. The Iron 
Curtain around the Soviet Union is the result and it grows higher 
and higher with every passing week. The fear-inspired efforts 
to plug every possible loop-hole in that barrier get more intensive 
with every passing week. 
I recently spent a month in Geneva in rather arduous ne­
gotiations with the Soviet Union and it was perfectly obvious to 
me that some of the best talent and most profound study in the 
Soviet Union is being devoted to the problem of thought control 
in the effort to isolate and insulate the Soviet Union from any 
\ 
sort of infiltration of ideas from the outside world. You prob-
� 
ably know that right now a purge is going on in Moscow-a 
purge of all individuals who have had any contact whatsoever 
with the West. One by one, individuals who have had some con-
tact with the West are being removed from positions of res-
ponsibility. They are being sent somewhere east of the Urals or 
to th.e salt mines or some such place where even their slight contact 
10 
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with the West will not contaminate the remainder of the popula­
tion with ideas which may be alien and somewhat challenging 
to the approved doS!trine. That purge is going on. Our corres­
pondent reports to us of the steady progress of this effort to 
weed out everybody who has been in contact with the West. 
You may remember that at one time the Red Army took 
over a rest hotel in Karlsbad where general officers were per­
mitted to go and enjoy the waters. It was decided some months 
ago that Karlsbad was too dangerous, too far west, for even a 
general officer to sojourn and so the rest hotel at Karlsbad was 
closed. This is just a further indication of the recognition which 
is being given to the field of public information. It should 
awaken us more fully than ever before to the importance of un­
derstanding the potentialities in this field. 
This is not a field which Americans take to with any de­
gree of satisfaction or ease. I doubt very much if many men in 
this room would greatly relish plunging into the task of handling 
publicity. I could be wrong, but it is my feeling that we are in­
stinctively repelled by the effort to try to control people's thinking. 
My major thesis is that we do not have to get into the 
position and the attitude of Dr. Goebbels or of any other totalitar­
ian manipulator of public thinking; that there is a different basis, 
a different formula, and a different concept and relationship which 
can be worke<J out in a representative government which can be 
• maintained and carried through with complete dignity, propriety
and self respect; that this can be carried through in an atmosphere
in which we are never seeking to soften up the other man's thinking
or his right to think, but in which we are responsive to his need to
know the largest possible area of fact, truth, and sound doctrine.
This is of course an age of publicity, not only in the totali-
11 
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tarian states but in our own. It is a brash new world of pub­
licity and we have to find out how to live in it. We might as well 
conclude that the newspaper, the radio and the P. R. 0., like the 
automobile, are here to stay. Instead of kicking against any irk­
some and irritating attributes of this weapon, we should learn 
better how to use it. I assure you that this is a study that will pay 
dividends as many have already discovered. 
I should like to make it clear, near the outset, that news­
paper men, people on our side of the fence so to speak, have a 
very great deal to learn. We have to accept new obligations of res­
ponsibility in these very troublesome days. There is (and every 
candid newspaper man will recognize it) far too much irres­
ponsibility on the side of the press. We work for the most part 
under a considerable handicap, a handicap that goes all the way 
back to events which took place in the Garden of Eden. The 
human mind is more interested in conflict, in disaster, in sensa­
tion, and in scandal, than in constructive, sound, forward-looking 
and sometimes unexciting developments. 
For the most part, publicity is built upon conflict and 
sensation and for this reason newspapers are more or less in a 
constant battle with their better selves. They are aware of the 
ways in which it is possible to cater to this human desire for 
sensation and scandal, conflict and disaster. At the same time 
every newspaper editor knows that he has a responsibility to the 
people-the responsibility to try to tell the truth. The acceptance 
of this responsibility and the setting of higher standards, I think, 
has made some progress within the American press. However 
the fact remains that in conducting public relations activities one 
must deal with an activity in which there is a premium on con­
flict, revelation of secrets, trash, scandal, and sensation. It is 
important to help newspapers rise above these imperatives which 
tend to drag them down. It is important to help newspapers 
12 
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carry through the responsibility which they owe to the public, to 
the nation, to the well-being of all. 
It is also true in many respects and with few exceptions 
that newspapers and radios live in abysmal ignorance of the 
Armed Forces. This means that the public is almost equally in 
such abysmal ignorance. 
Ignorance is a constant danger; ignorance is the weapon 
of totalitarianism. Iron Curtains are always a greater danger 
to the power seeking to hide behind them than they are to anyone 
else. I believe Iron Curtains more often hide weakness than 
strength. Perhaps some of you can confirm this statement from 
personal observation. 
About a little over a year ago when I was in Japan, I was 
taken by Capt. Decker down to Yokosuka to visit the former Jap­
anese naval base there. Captain Decker and other officers made 
it very clear to me that the tremendous wall of secrecy which 
the Japanese built about that particular spot hid weakness rather 
than strength and that the stories which we had heard during the 
thirties of vast dreadnaughts and of other great developments 
being worked out in the Japanese shipyards were, to a large ex­
tent, myths which had been able to come into being, spawn and 
flourish behind walls of ignorance. Therefore, obviously, these 
Iron Curtains of ignorance are in a sense a greater danger to the 
person who is seeking to erect and maintain them than they are 
to the rest of us • 
Of course it is necessary sometimes, in an emergency, to 
hide weakness. Everybody recognizes the necessity for the right 
forms of censorship in wartime and for the concealment of mili­
tary secrets in peacetime. There is a tendency for censorship 
to become habit forming and for information which could break 
13 
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down public ignorance to be held up long after the need for 
secrecy. There have been violations, gross and grave violations, 
of what should have been a patriotic obligation not to print. I 
think those violations will be fewer and the right relationship will 
be maintained if every responsible officer in the armed services is 
prepared to weigh the legitimate need for secrecy against the 
legitimate need of the public to know. More often than not, 
ignorance is the greatest danger of all. Public participation, pub­
lic partnership, is a great good in itself. which must. be achieved
in the largest possible degree.· 
The armed services are part of the public services of the 
nation which means that ·an officer in the armed services is a 
public servant and like other public servants he must accept as a 
part of his public obligation the duty of giving an account of 
himself to the public. This is done through proper channels, 
in a proper way and through such media of ultimate expression 
as the press, the radio and so on. The more accurately and the 
more fully the public understands the goal and the performance 
of the armed services, the more whole heartedly will the public 
support those services. Particularly in these precarious times, 
it is desperately important for the public to understand the 
precise role of the armed services. All this means that today, 
more than ever before in peacetime, it is necessary for the armed 
services to study the duty, the opportunity and the technique of 
public relations. 
More than once during the recent war, several of these 
three qualities were not adequately recognized. We did see an 
enormous expansion of technique during the war. Public relations 
officers blossomed everywhere but their mere existence is far from 
enough. Some of the worst crimes against public information, 
some of the greatest damage to the armed services themselves and 
to individual officers was done by public relations officers who 
14 
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misunderstood and misapplied their energies. Conversely, some 
of the best public information work was done not by public re­
lations officers but by professional officers who had grasped the 
duty and opportunity of a public relations program. 
We have come a very long way from the exasperated of­
' ficer, early in the last war, who once declared at a Washington 
cocktail party, speaking of war correspondents, "I wouldn't tell 
them anything until the war was over and then I'd tell them 
who won." This is a natural enough feeling and one can sym­
pathize with it, particularly if one has known some war corres­
pondents. Nevertheless strength comes from the people and the 
ultimate strength of the Armed Services will rest upon the de­
gree of public support. Public relations technique can be stymied 
if there is not a recognition, from the top on down, of the duty of 
keeping the public informed. ' I wish to quote an eloquent para­
graph recognizing this duty and put into excellent words by Lt. 
General Collins, now Deputy Chief of Staff. This paragraph 
says what I think we all agree on; forgive me if it is covered 
in terms of the Army: 
"Responsibility of the Army is to make sure that 
the public has real information on which to base sound 
evaluation of it's Army. The Army has nothing to hide 
and nothing to fear if it recognizes the public as a partner, 
as well as a boss; if it ignores the captious critic and 
assumes that public confidence is there for the making. 
But it cannot expect that confidence unless it is deserved. 
The individual soldier, commissioned and enlisted, is res­
ponsible for seeing that it is deserved. It �s the responsi-
bility of the Commander to see to it that his officers and 
men conduct themselves in the manner that will win the 
public esteem and that the military establishment has 
the high professional standards expected of it by the pub­
lic. It is the job of the public relations officer to assist 
the Commander .in cementing this partnership with the 
15 
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public by providing accurate, full, and unbiased· informa­
tion and by interpreting the profession of arms to a nation 
which is eager to be proud of its armed srvices." 
That is the basic relationship which needs to be understood and 
carried out. 
I had personal contact with a good deal of public relations 
work in the last war and it is my impression that the very best 
public relations work was done at the top. I had the opportun­
ity during the war of sitting in on informal conferences with 
Admiral King and General Marshall. Both of these men did a 
superb job of discussing with our group (which was representa­
tive of the nation's editors) the state of affairs, the problems 
which arose, difficulties and so on. To my knowledge there was 
no instance of any violation of their confidence. 
The best public refations. work can be done at the top and 
the tone can be set which will permeate the entire service. If it 
, is continuously recognized that the greatest possible achievement 
is to get close· to the people, then the public relations program 
will be on a sound basis. I don't know whether it is worthwhile 
to go into any post-mortems of some of the public relations work 
of the last. war. In preparation for this talk I asked half a dozen 
of the members of our staff who were themselves either public 
relations officers, several of them in the Navy, or who were war 
correspondents, to give me memoranda analyzing the problem as 
they had seen it in action during the second World War. They 
gave me some very hard-hitting and candid answers. 
They support the point that I have been making, that the 
main thing is to get underneath the psychology which would 
naturally prefer to fight a war in private. Secrecy is an im­
portant part of war. You deal properly here, day in and day 
out, with classified documents and information, confidential and 
secret material. In the nature of things you may be more ac-
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customed and more indoctrinated with concealing than with re­
vealing. That point of view, which is entirely proper and sound, 
has to be reconsidered in relationship to the problem of public 
'information. You are trained to think accurately, precisely and 
scientifically. The average newspaper writer is not necessarily 
trained to think in quite that same way. He is trained to in­
terest the public. Hence there is not a natural meeting of minds 
between men trained as you are and men who are trained as 
newspaper men. That gulf has to be bridged. It can be 
bridged if it is realized that along side this duty of secrecy,' 
which should never be breached, is the positive advantage of 
letting the public know everything that it can know safely. The 
advantage of an informed public has to be weighed against the 
precaution taken by not giving out information. It is a little bit 
like the relationship of sins of commission and omission. There 
is a natural inhibition against letting information out unless there 
is some positive reason for it or unless the information is perfect­
,ly innocuous. That attitude must be studied and re.;.examined in 
the light of the importance of an informed public. 
There was a revolution in public relations during the last 
war. Our men who were both public relations officers and war 
correspondents agree that in late '44 and '45 the expansion of 
public relations in the Pacific was on the whole a very healthy 
and important decision. The gratitude of the press to the men 
who were responsible for that expansion and revolution in policy 
is great. It was, however, an uphill job. 
I want to outline the elements of a constructive public re­
lations program. First, establish a general concept, from the 
Naval Academy on up, that it is important for the public to un­
,derstand that information is a precious asset to be used con­
structively and advantageously. It is important to have the at.;. 
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titude, not of constant desire to hold everything back, but of 
responsiveness to the opportunity of public relations which pro­
duces an instinctively right public relations program. We have 
to get back to fundamental thinking in a responsible government 
and to realize that the support of the public is, as I have said 
so often, the most precious and valuable asset that can be had. 
The second element is to establish clearly the distinction 
between information and propaganda. I think one of the worst 
curses which ran through our public relations program, particular­
ly during the war, was a sort of shame-faced feeling on the 
part of responsible officers that they were really being called 
upon to become propagandists and they didn't like being propa­
gandists. This instinctive American abhorrence for propaganda, 
and an out-and-out dislike for the word is sound and right. No 
one should be called upon to become a propagandist and no one en­
gaged in public relations work should shoulder the inferiority 
complex of thinking that he is a propagandist. There doesn't have 
to be any propaganda to it. The problem is simply one of an open 
channel of information between the services and the people. I 
think the curse, the feeling that one is a propagandist, came into 
being especially when adverse and disagreeable news had to be 
handled. That need not be the case at all. Responsiveness is the 
keynote. A relationship, a bond, a link, a channel, between the 
services and the public is the keynote. Responsibility, not pro­
motion or propaganda is the basic word. 
Don't worry too much about adverse publicity on stories 
which are technically incorrect or seem to be undesirable. It 
wouldn't do much harm if officers who are forced in this mael­
strom of public relations could get some of the psychological at­
titude of the politician. The successful politician, as you all know, 
has a hide as thick as an elephant and only starts worrying when 
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he doesn't get into the headlines. An adverse headline is regard­
ed as just as much of an asset as a favorable headline. The im­
portant thing is that the politician has to be talked about, to be 
in the news-not forgotten. You remember the advertising cam­
paign which went on for a good many years warning people of 
the horrors of pink tooth-brush. The campaign was finally 
abandoned partly because so many people kept going into drug 
stores and asking to buy a pink toothbrush. 
This really proves the point that confused public concepts 
do build up but in spite of this it is important to have the public 
aware of the Navy and of its basic problems. The public will not 
always be as wrong as the pink toothbrush people were. I have, 
and I think probably you all have, a rather profound belief in the 
fact that public opinion balances up; that while any number of in­
dividuals may be wrong, there is a certain fundamental righ�ness 
in the general will and in the general direction of the popular opin­
ion when at least a minimum of information gets to the people. 
So I say it is important not to be too sensitive, too meticulous, or too 
fussy about the things one gets into in this public relations business, 
but emulate the hard-boiled old politicians. I have never heard 
Mayor Curley of Boston complain although nine-tenths of his pub­
licity in the last 25 years has been seemingly adverse. The old 
scoundrel knows that any publicity has a certain value. This is 
a pretty cynical view I know, gentlemen, but you are up against 
a profession which has to deal with popularization. 
It is necessary to study the techniques ()f public relations 
and to be in touch with experts in the profession as the situation 
requires. There is a wide diversity of opinion as to the techniques 
of public relations. It is not a scientific professon with every­
thing worked out on a slide rule basis but at the same time 
there are experts. Newspaper men are not, by any means, always 
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the best experts in the field; there is a difference between the 
role of the reporter and the role of the public relations officer. 
One of the most successful public relations officers in the service 
of the American government, Mike McDermott, of the State De­
partment, has been at the business for over a quarter century. 
He was never a newspaper man. As a matter of fact, Mike start­
ed out as a stenographer and began to absorb, by some kind of 
osmosis, the necessary relationship between the press and the gov­
ernment service. 
As I said, many other newspaper reporters who have tried 
to do the same thing have failed because of the difference be­
tween the public relations relationship and the reporter's relation­
ship with the press. However, there is a technique and it is being 
studied and developed to a degree. Progress fa being made in re­
ducing this to terms which may be studied and comprehended by 
people coming in from the outside. 
But this technique is tremendously subordimrte to attitudes. 
One basic attitude is the value of maintaining contacts, of getting 
close to newspaper men and keeping close to them. I emphasize 
that it is valuable to maintain this contact at the highest level pos­
sible and to add plenty of follow-through at lower levels. If you 
·do have contact with the newspaper men, friendships and relation­
ships, social and informal contacts, then I think you will begin to
understand more clearly the viewpoint of the newspaper man. You
will understand that his job is the task of popularizing things, of
getting into people's thinking, and you may soften up some of your
quite natural indignation at the over-simplification of problems. It
is a very difficult thing to convert a technical subject to terms the
public can readily understand. There are bound to be errors, lack
of precise and explicit qualifying remarks, in every popularized
account but it is a problem we cannot get around and have to
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accept. A lot of this publicity will be repulsive to the expert but, 
nevertheless, it does serve a useful purpose in getting through to 
public thinking. 
I strongly recommend the habit of press conferences when­
ever there is any need and opportunity. It is even possible to come 
to enjoy press conferences after a certain amount of experience 
with them. 
I have already referred to the importance of understanding 
the viewpoint of newspapers. Newspapers cannot escape the ob­
ligation of popularizing material, the duty of holding public in­
terest. This need for popularizing is terribly overdone and abused 
but we are dealing with the people who will decide the pattern of 
national defense in the United States. We must inform and edu­
cate them. We cannot ignore them; we cannot permit them to 
remain in the shadow of ignorance which has frequently surround­
ed them. This goes pretty deep. The difference between our­
selves and our enemies in this world is probably best. defined as 
the differnce between a nation which respects the individual as the 
most important element and value within the nation and one which 
declares the individual to be valueless and the state to be all im­
portant and all powerful. 
The only way totalitarian states can maintain their hold on 
the people, can make their force actually operative, is to control, 
to destroy the independent thinking of their people. By allo�­
ing public expression there is bound to be conflict and diversity 
of thinking. This was the primary issue at. our conference on 
Freedom of Information at Geneva. The great cleavage between 
the Ea.stern Bloc and ourselves was this: they believe in one single 
set of ideas, imposed by force, which is infiltrated into the people's 
thinking by artful devices, subtle techniques and ruthless re­
pressions----in short, by complete thought control; while to us 
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· strength comes from diversity and a belief that all progress comes
from the conflict of ideas.
This basic principle of diversity, of conflict, of growth 
through the stress or strain of ideas meeting in healthy conflict, 
we believe will produce strength. I think that by taking a long 
historic viewpoint the germs of weakness contained within the 
totalitarian system are those which have wiped out genuine self­
criticism; whereas with us, self-criticism and conflict of ideas pro­
duce a healthy organism which goes forward, revises its ideas, im­
proves its ideas, and carries them ahead. 
The relationship of that principle with the press is this: 
You will encounter a diversity in publications and a diversity of 
treatments in the press. It will be apparent that the viewpoint 
and technique of one newspaper w.ill be very different from an­
other, but if you appreciate that the vagaries, the irresponsibilities, 
the over-simplifications of the press go back to the· idea of free 
and diverse opinions, you will be more tolerant and will se.e that any 
effort to generalize or to standardize the· press will be a technique 
pointed in the totalitarian direction and would lead us away from 
-our greatest source of strength which is our cantankerousness and
our unwillingness to accept standardized concepts. I am deeply
confident that techniques of study and of working out problems
here, as in every other well conducted American institution, will be
based on constant reexamination of ideas. That is part and parcel
of our public information system.
Freedom of the American press depends upon diversity. 
Your relationship to the press will depend upon the recognition 
of its importance to the public and of its value to you. There 
is no chance of a meeting of minds between the East and the West 
on so fundamental a matter of principle as this matter of public 
information, but we in the West must not be victims to totalitar-
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ian thinking to such an extent that we will deny the people the 
diversity of information which will enable them to go forward, 
which will enable them constantly to reexamine, to criticize and 
to grow strong through self-examination and self-criticism. 
In two. wars, the two greatest and most tragic wars of his­
tory, the United States Navy was headed by newspaper publishers­
Secretary Daniels 'and Secretary Knox. After the First World 
War the Navy became involved in the most extensive disarmament 
program in our national experience. After the Second World War 
the Navy ran into an economy wave which had for a time very 
grave consequences. These two experiences would seem to indi­
cate that there is still a very large unsolved problem about the pub­
lic's information concerning its armed services despite enormous 
efforts and real progress. It is fair to conclude that that prob­
lem has not yet been adequately solved. I repeat, take seriously 
the opportunity of getting closer to the public through the media of 
public information. I believe that every officer should be conscious 
of the significance of this task, not as an onerous chore, not as an 
undignified and unworthy type of dissemination of propaganda, 
put rather as an enormous opportunity to be responsive to the need 
and the right of people to know everything which will not be a 
positive danger. 
Now as I said before, I think you have to work primarily 
against a viewpoint which rightly and almost instinctively holds 
that it is safer not to talk too much. One has to be aware and 
conscious at all times that along side of this important obligation 
must go the requirement to do a better job of breaking down the 
barriers of ignorance by giving the American people more informa­
tion with which to grow through conflict and diversity, criticism 
and reexamination; to grow into an appreciation of the world res­
ponsibilities which have become ours. This relationship of pub-
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lie information to the future of peace or war in the world is sim­
ple to understand. It is simple but the people of the United 
States must understand the importance of a strong national de­
fense of arms adequate to maintain our duty and obligation in this 
storm-tossed world. Unless the American people do adequately 
understand these necessities the dangers of war are doubled and 
trebled. If the American people do understand the necessity of 
strength at this time, if instead of some vague and ignorant concept 
based largely on fear they understand that our rearmament pro­
gram of today is not a war program but a peace program, then, in­
deed, there is a possibility of maintaining peace in the world. 
At Geneva in our small way we ran the gamut of relation­
ships with the Eastern Bloc. American diplomacy since the war 
has not been very shrewd or successful in its relationship with the 
Eastern Bloc but certain fundamentals had managed to seep 
through. As we pr�pared our tactics for the Geneva conference 
we decided that the basic thing was to take a very strong, almost a 
provocative, position at the outset, to maintain it throughout and 
to get the jump on every single point where we could get our pro­
posals, our ideas and our policies in first. The chief American 
delegate at the opening session of that conference made an ex­
tremely strong and provocative speech which completely changed 
the tone of the conference. The Russians immediately turned con­
ciliatory, placating and appeasing. They sought to weedle around 
the middle group nations to support an appeasing attitude. Every 
time we came in strong the air cleared, and the Eastern delegates 
had to appeal for some form of conciliation, some form of com­
promise. We maintained to the end a refusal to compromise, say­
ing it was impossible to compromise in a field of basic principles. 
Now that teaches us a lesson that the American people 
ought to understand. The American people are being appealed to 
today by various individuals who know that the American people 
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want peace. •It is perfectly obvious that the American people want 
peace but not at any price. We want to insure peace but our ex­
perience at Geneva proved to us again that the way to insure peace 
is through strength, vigor and capacity; to lay down a position 
and to maintain it. 
The American people have not altogther understood that. To 
the American people a rearmament program sometimes seems a 
war-like program. I believe that the undeviating informational 
line of the armed services should be : that our rearmament program 
is a peace program, not a war prog�am; that it is the only basis 
on which we can hope, at this stage of human and world experi­
ence, to insure peace; that the sacrifice and expenditures which 
the American people are being called upon to make are not expendi­
tures in the interests of war but rather expenditures in the interests 
of preserving the peace and that the program of appeasement which 
Mr, Henry Wallace, for example, is presenting to the American 
people and to which he is getting a response, is due to the basic 
craving of the American people to avoid a Third World War, a 
craving which is perfectly sound and right but based upon ig­
norance. 
The whole problem of peace comes down to this problem 
· of dispelling fears by letting the American public see that the
necessity for supp<;>rting a rearmament program is not because
we are afraid of the Russians or of anyone else, but because it is
the way to achieve peace at this time. Public int�rest on this sub­
ject will not be dispelled through silence but will be dispelled
through a responsive attitude toward the need of the public to
know everything that it possibly can. If any chances are taken
they must be taken on the side of knowledge rather than on the
side of ignorance.
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I believe that this opportunity can be seized and that we do 
have a chance to achieve a stable world. It is a necessity to carry 
through this kind of information program if the armed forces are 
to preserve their rightful place as pillars in the temple of peace. 
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ECONOMIC WARFARE - THE DEFENSE 
A lecture delivered by 
Prof. Charles Cortez Abbott 
at the Naval War College 
November 9, 1948 
My subject this morning is Economic· Warfare-The De­
fense. In particular I �hall address myself to problems concern­
ing the defense of the United States and her allies-actual or po­
tential-in the present "cold war" and in the event hostilities 
break out between this country and Russia. 
There appear to be three distinct aspects of this subject 
that merit attention. In the first place, there is the protection, in 
a physical sense, of the United States and her allies and of the areas 
from which they draw essential war materials. In other words, 
economic defense of the United States must include defense of more 
than the territories within our natural boundaries. There are geo­
graphical areas important to us in the light of political and economic 
considerations which from the point of view of national interest 
must be def ended. In the second place, there is the maintenance 
and defense of the high level economy which the United States 
has maintained since V-J day. The protection of this condition is 
necessary, partly for strictly military reasons and partly because 
American prosperity is of great political consequence throughout 
the world. In the third place, there is the ideological conflict. There 
will not be time to say much about this aspect of the problem this 
morning. I would, however, like to say at this. point that under 
present conditions economic warfare is not simply a "battle for sup­
plies," as it was in World Wars I and II. It is also a struggle of 
Professor Abbott is Professor of Business Economics at Harvard 
University. His lecture entitled "Economic Warfare-The Attack" 
appeared in the February issue of "Information Service." 
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ideas, of achievements, of two opposed economic systems. In this 
ideological struggle, propaganda, which has always been a recog­
nized part of economic warfare, will probably play a larger part 
than it did in the Second World War. 
Since in my lecture a year ago I spoke in some detail regard� 
ing the problem of protecting a high level economy, most of my 
attention this morning will be devoted to the first aspect of that 
problem-the protection of the United States and her allies,. and 
particularly of the areas from which they draw supplies. 
Before examining particular facets of the problem it may 
be helpful if I give some of the background of my thinking on this 
whole general subject. It would appear that in the event of hos­
tilities many of our actual needs, political and economic, may not 
be greatly different from the needs of the Second World War, but 
the measures needed to satisfy them I presume might differ ap­
preciably. 
As regards supplies, it seems likely that the types and per­
haps the amounts of strategic and critical materials which we might 
need would not be greatly dissimilar to our requirements in the last 
war, although I would hope that the Emergency Shipping Priority 
List might be trimmed somewhat. One very interesting estimate 
that has come to my attention since my last talk, which was based 
on the resources available in areas one might expect would be 
controlled respectively by the United States and by the U. S. S. R., 
suggests that our chief shortages in the event of hostilities would 
be mercury, bauxite, manganese, and oil. I may add that this same 
estimate indicated that the chief shortages of the Soviets would 
likely be nickel, tin, copper and lead, tungsten, and of course, oil. 
Satisfaction of our needs will of course require the control 
of the sea lanes. While sea power might not be as useful for the 
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blockade of Russia as it was for Germany, it nevertheless would be 
of the highest importance-in order to assure this country and 
allied areas of a steady flow of supplies, in order to support ad­
vance bases from which attacks against Russia might be mounted, 
such as British East Africa and Cyprus, and in order to restrict 
the movement of enemy agents and of persons capable of induc­
ing subversive movements. I make this last point in full recog­
nition of the fact that the development of the airplane and the sub­
marine has made restrictions of the movements of enemy agents 
far more difficult than formerly. 
In the last war the phrase "Western Hemisphere Defense" 
was one of the common cliches. It has been suggested that in the 
event of hostilities we would probably have to add "Security of 
the North Atlantic Community" to this former objective, and I 
presume, the economic and military defense of other areas as 
well. Certainly the maintenance of relative economic stability in 
Latin America would be essential, partly because of physical prox­
imity, �artly because of the essential foods and raw materials 
which we would need to draw from that area. None of these pur­
poses, you will observe, can be attained without control of the sea 
lanes. 
As before, there will probably be a price attached to main­
tenance of economic and political stability in the areas important 
to us. In its simplest and perhaps its easiest form this price may be 
merely the extension of various- kinds of dollar loans . and credits. 
It is more likely, however, that the price will consist of things 
that these areas will want from us: shipping f:!pace, scarce materials, 
manufactured goods, and so on. It seems to me altogether prob­
able that the servicing by us of some so-called minimum standard 
of economic and business needs will be the price-if not of friend­
ship, at least of political and economic conditions that serve our in­
terest. Iceland presumably will want hay, fertilizer, agrfoutural 
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machinery, and manufactured goods; the East Coast of South 
America will want newsprint, coal, and steel ; South Africa will 
want railroad cars and mining machinery, as well as silk stockings, 
toilet paper, and dry cereals; Canada will want fats and oils, es­
pecially peanut butter. To push this thinking one step further, 
I would guess that Canada might ask not only for supplies but also 
for the maintenance in Latin America of outlets for her pulp, 
newsprint, and other products. 
I can readily conceive that the price of stability in certain 
colonial areas may be the purchase of entire crops or outputs of 
raw materials, conceivably even at premium prices. Some of these 
commodities may be needed in their entirety, but it is not realistic 
to think that we will be so lucky actually as to want all of them. 
In the last war the loss of the European market made the entire 
copper output of South America available to us and, as you know, 
it was bought here. The Metals Reserves Corporation alone in the 
four years ending Novembr 1, 1944, bought $400,000,000 of South 
American copper. Fortunately we needed this item, and it was 
available to us .. Maintenance of the Chilean economy, however, in 
a style somewhat better than that to which it was accustomed, was 
a fortunate by-product. I can readily conceive of this situation 
being reversed, so that the maintenance of the Chilean, or the 
South African, or the East African economy through commodity 
purchases might become the prime objective, and the acquisition 
of commodities a somewhat embarrassing by-product of the policy. 
The ability of our adversaries to frustrate these objectives 
will certainly be of a. somewhat different character and may be of 
somewhat larger dimensions than was the case in the Second World 
War. The mechanisms of economic penetration at the service of 
the Russians, which they are using and will use, are quite dissim-
ilar to those of the Nazis. There will not, presumably, be the prob-
lem of enemy-owned business concerns and trade connectio:ns, at 
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least not on the same scale. There is no' Russian counterpart to the 
I. G. Farbenindustrie. The problem of hidden or "cloaked" en­
emy assets will be of much smaller p�oportions. On the other hand,
it is doubtful if the Nazis ever commanded a fifth column of the pro­
portions of the Communist party and its sympathizers; the problem 
of loyalty, with its many ramifications, will be far more severe. 
In terms of the specific measures of economic warfare and penetra­
tion with which we shall have to contend, it is probably safe to 
assume that the amount of competitive buying of scarce materials 
in neutral markets will be reduced. While it may be ventured 
that the Russians have an adequate supply of gold to use as a means 
of payment in competitive buying, I would assume that they might 
be severely handicapped through lack of an effective world-wide 
network of trade connections. As far as I can determine, a system 
of trading relations and established commercial connections are 
almost if not quite as important for competitive or preclusive 
buying as is an adequate supply of the means for payment. 
Against this background of thinking we may now consider 
in more detail two of the aspects of the problem which I mentioned 
at the outset: maintenance of political and economic stability in 
areas important to the national interest of the United States, 
and preservation of a high level economy in this country. 
I shall not try to designate with any precision the areas 
which it will be important for us to defend. The forces that 
will determine these areas, however, are reasonably clear. There 
will be the countries which are our allies; there will be the 
interests of military strategy; there will be the areas from which 
we have to draw our essential supplies; a,nd particularly there will 
be the areas from which our Allies will have to draw their essential 
supplies. For example, the Argentine will be of more importance 
to Great Britain than to us because of the United Kingdom's de­
pendence upon Argentine beef, although this country will no doubt 
also need Argentine linseed and quebracho. 
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Evidently if we are to receive aid from these areas or give 
it to them, control of the means of transportation and communica­
tion will be essential. Maintenance of our position will be depend­
ent upon supremacy on the sea. While such control may be of 
less offensive significance than in the first two World Wars, its de­
fensive significance will be greater and, consequently, the threat 
of submarine attack may be of even larger moment. 
We can anticipate that economic attacks against our inter­
ests in "our" areas will be made. In general I suspect that the 
attacks will not be through what we might call "recognized" in­
struments of economic warfare-blockade, trade agreements, 
preclusive buying, and so forth-but will be intended to disrupt 
the smooth functioning of the productive process and the flow of 
trade. On the whole, it does not appear that Russia will be able to 
use effectively the recognized types of economic pressure; but she 
has at her disposal other means for accomplishing the same ends. 
Let me be more explicit. 
In the first two World Wars the United States and the 
United Kingdom employed shipping controls and preclusive buy­
ing to cut off supplies from Central European powers. A civil 
disturbance in South America, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, or 
Malaya, sponsored by Moscow, could be used for much the same 
purpose-to cut off supplies from the United States or the United 
Kingdom. This country and Great Britain have in the past used 
commodity purchase agreements to shape the economy of neutral 
and also colonial areas in such a way as to assist our war pro-
grams. Our interest at the present time and in the· future will lie 
in the maintenance of political stability and a continued production 
of necessary materials in these areas. The Russians are quite 
capable of various types of operation designed to thwart our in-
terests which is the same as saying that they have methods of
shaping the economic processes in these areas to t:heir purpose. 
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Strikes, sabotage, political unrest, inflation, or any other operation 
that reduces production or disturbs the normal tenor of business 
will serve the Russian .purpose, much as commodity purchase agree­
ments have served the purpose of this country and of Great Britain 
in the past. I make this point notwithstanding the fact that Rus­
sia is using trade agreements with her European satellites much as 
if she were a capitalistic power. In the last war we lost control of 
Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines through 
Japanese conquest. If in these areas Communist or nationalistic 
movements sponsored by Moscow should spread, I can conceive that 
we might lose their resources almost as fully as if we had lost con­
trol of the areas themselves. It does not take great imagination 
to see that strikes in key industries and stoppage in key plants 
can have much the same effect on production as if those indus­
tries and plants were the object of strategic bombing. I was 
interested to observe that the November 1st issue of TIME carried 
a story to the effect that the coal strike in France was a political 
maneuver aimed at hampering the Marshall Plan and European 
recovery. The current strike of longshoremen in this country in­
itially had the effect of permitting us to supply· Alaska only by an 
air lift, and of putting extreme pressure on Hawaii; latterly it 
has had the effect of constricting shipments to Western Europe 
under the Marshall Plan. 
My conclusion may seem far-fetched, but I cannot see why 
an effort could not be made through a world-wide movement, partly 
Communistic and partly nationalistic, in colonial areas, to cut off 
the highly industrialized, raw material importing portions of the 
globe from supplies that are produced in those areas. There is 
already trouble in greater or lesser degree in Southeast Asia, the 
Near East, the Far East, and West Africa. Other parts of the 
world, such as North Africa and certain sections of Latin America, 
are clearly susceptible to this type of penetration. If such an ef-
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fort were combined with strikes and sabotage in key areas, notably 
in docks, harbors, and the maritime industries, it would seem to me 
that we might have a reasonable facsimile of a olockade. If, as many 
people think, in the next war strategy and operations will neces­
sarily be subject to logistics, disturbances in the areas from which 
supplies are obtained will come to have a new and a more sinis­
ter significance. 
While the North American continent is perhaps only mod­
erately vulnerable to this type of pressure, it is quite clear that 
certain other areas "on our side," notably the United Kingdom 
and parts of Western Europe, are distinctly vulnerable. Next to 
the coal shortage, probably· the major shortages in Western 
Europe and in the low countries are shortages of such imported 
items as fertilizers, leather, fibers, fats, and oils. Practically all 
of these items are of colonial origin. 
It may seem that I have belabored this point, but I believe 
it is of real moment and I wish to give two final examples of what 
I mean. Present plans for European aid assume, I believe, that 
by 1951 80 % of Europe's petroleum imports will come from the 
Middle East, and that by that date there will be a greatly in­
creased volume of European trade across the Iron Curtain. 
Clearly the validating of these assumptions depends much more 
on Russian action than on ours. It is inconceivable that Russia 
could not hamper shipments of petroleum from the Middle East 
if she so wished, and certainly the development of east-west trade 
in Europe depends directly on her policy. It follows of course, that 
if these assumptions of the European aid programs are not val-
idated there will be a commensurate increase in the economic 
pressure exerted on our economy; at the very least the present 
pressure will not be diminished. 
The conclusion of this line of thought is that the war po-
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tential of the United States and her allies is most easily attacked 
by indirection, and that the area most vulnerable to attack is in the 
peripheral sectors of Eurasia and in the colonial territories that 
furnish raw material. The kind of attack to be expected, it would 
appear, is a combination of measures not ordinarily looked on as 
the "orthodox" measures of economic warfare, but which would 
have the same purpose and could be highly effective. 
To meet this type of attack there are immediately evident 
tw<? countermoves : One is the continuance-or better yet the ex­
tension-of international trade and the present high level of 
prosp�rity. The other is stockpiling. I do not intend in this lecture 
to try to explore the first of these countermoves, but I do want to 
say a little something about stockpiling, and in this term I in­
clude off shore stockpiling as well as reserves built up in this 
country. 
, Stockpiling is of course one of the recognized, classical, or­
thodox measures of economic warfare. It is designed to circumvent 
the effect of a blockade, or at least to mitigate the effects of a 
sudden shortage of essential items. If it is. done on any large 
scale it must be done by governmental agencies, partly because 
of the amount of money involved (especially if premium prices are 
paid), partly because of problems involved in storing and handling, 
and partly because utilization of stockpiles must be geared in with 
whatever system of allocations and priorities is being employed. 
Although the operation must be financed and administered by 
government agencies, the operation must be conducted in close 
collaboration with industry if it is to be effective. 
It may be worth while to quote here some portions of the 
"Report on Activities of Metal Reserves Company" for the period 
June 28, 1940-November 1, 1944, signed by Charles B. Hender­
son, then president of the M. R. C. and chairman of the R. F. C. 
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The report covers the period prior to the creation of the United 
States Commercial Corporation. According to this report the 
M. R. C. contributed to the war effort in four ways:
"It has created stockpiles of metals and minerals that
provide assurance for continued production of military
goods, regardless of possible interruption of supplies."
· "It has assisted in increasing the total volume of metals and
minerals currently flowing into the war effort by making
available to industry, on allocation by the W. P. B., metals
and minerals from sources not available directly to private
industry."
"It has helped to stabilize prices ........ by selling at OPA 
ceiling prices" -even though it had bought at premium 
prices, above OP A ceilings or levels we might consider 
"economic." 
"It has contributed to the war program by reducing the 
strength of the foe through its purchases of supplies 
from sources available to unfriendly (later enemy) 
powers." 
As you know, the M. R. C. was originally set up to stock­
pile two commodities, tin and manganese; in the four years of its 
operation the list increased to 49. Its transactions covered 51 
foreign countries, 31 states of the Union, Alaska, and the Phil­
ippines. In addition to buying commodities it paid subsidies to 
marginal producers who were thereby enabled to produce and sell 
in the ordinary channels of trade at OP A ceiling prices. It set 
up subsidiary corporations to operate DPC facilities designed to 
produce scarce items. While a substantial number of the stock­
pile goals were met 100 % or more, a good many goals were not 
attained. Achievement of the goal, of course, does not tell the 
whole story of the operation, since sales were continually made 
from stockpiles during the period when they were being built up. 
I may observe here that some of the audits required of 
government corporations under the Corporation Control Act of 
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1945 are just now .becoming available. If we are to take these 
audits at face value, the stockpiling operation, so far as its book­
keeping was concerned, certainly left something to be desired. 
If such operations in the future are carried on on a large scale, 
here is surely one area where there is considerable room for im-
,·�rovement. 
The conclusion that I reach concerning stockpiling is that 
a limited amount, designed· to prevent a sudden interruption 
in supplies, may be very useful. But if events develop· in such 
a way that more than a moderate stockpile program is urged, or 
if substantial reliance is placed on this type of operation, such 
circumstances indicate that the economic war under either hot 
or cold conditions, is being lost. 
Let me turn to the second aspect of the problem which I 
mentioned at the beginning of this lecture, the defense of a high 
level economy. In my talk a year ago I took the line. that the 
present high level economy in the United States-with its record­
breaking national income, its "over-employment," its high tax 
receipts, and its large profits-was a fact of great political and 
economic consequence throughout the world. For three years we 
have had a most successful economy, more successful than any­
one could have hoped for in 1945 and certainly more successful 
than the best expectations of many of the "planners"· who fore­
cast much lower levels of production and employment. Except 
for price stability we have met all the tests of a successful econ­
omy given in the textbooks; we have had full employment and 
something more, record-breaking levels of production, a declin­
ing debt and burden of taxation, a high level of profits, ail in­
creasing volume of capital in".'estment, and a rising standard of
living. 
It is this high level economy which makes possible support of 
a $40 billion budget and a $250 billion debt, together with the 
37 
41
Naval War College: March 1949 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
enormous "unrequited" exports of which shipments under the 
Marshall Plan are only a part. As you know, "unrequited" is 
the economists way of describing exports for which you are not 
paid. This high level economy has demonstrated to the world the 
volume of production possible under a free market economy, avail­
able either for armament purposes or for raising the standard of 
living of the population. In our "positional war" with the Soviets 
this achievement has been something that the Russians undoubt­
edly had not counted on. 
Unfortunately, a high level economy is a vulnerable econ­
omy. It is vulnerable either to a recession or to a final burst of 
inflation and speculation that makes a recession inevitable and 
more severe than might otherwise be the case. The Russians have 
confidently expected and predicted a recession. Should that occur 
it would weaken our tax base and our ability to supply raw ma­
terials, food, and capital equipment to Europe. It would seriously 
compromise the position of the United States on the international 
stage, since it would validate the Marxian prophecies. 
The Russians could-as could any state with sufficient re­
sources and particularly an authoritarian state-undertake from 
the outside measures to precipitate either a bust or the final states 
of a boom that precede a bust. In my lecture a year ago I 
mentioned certain maneuvers that could be undertaken for this 
kind of purpose, such as the disorganization of markets for in­
ternational commodities, the use of gold shipments for political 
purposes, and the falsification or misinterpretation of government 
statistics. 
The greatest danger, however, I believe lies in the pressures 
that can be exerted from the outside in this country on the fed­
eral budget, with the consequent repercussions on taxation, spend­
ing, and borrowing. I am so thoroughly convinced that the greatest 
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danger of overstraining the American economy lies here, in the 
problem of the big budget, that I vyill not even stop to argue the 
case. The methods available to the U.S. S. R. for exerting pressures 
in the field of "big government" and "big spending," both in foreign 
and domestic fields, are numerous. The implications of these 
. pressures are almost· infinite and extend far beyond the limits of 
this lecture. They involve not only the whole field of public finance 
and fiscal policy, but also a detailed consideration of how our econ­
omy works-down to, say, the adequacy of depreciation policies 
of individual companies. 
I will make only two observations as regards this type of 
pressure. Insofar as Russia, in what we may call the area of 
"foreign spending", can increase t�e needs for such things as 
ERP or European rearmament through political tensions, dis­
ruption of trade, diminution of production, or civil disturbance, 
the pressure on our economy is increased. This fact is now be­
coming generally recognized. On November 4, Edson Smith, the 
financial editor of the Boston Herald said: "It is becoming in­
creasingly apparent that whether by accident or design the Russian 
government is forcing us into a spending program which makes 
the achievement of a stable economy at home practically impos­
sible." The implications of such a situation, as I have indicated, 
are extremely serious. 
"The area of domestic spending'' seems to me to fall natur­
ally in the orbit of ideological warfare. Insofar as a public opin­
ion can be created which demands and expects big government 
spending for social security, farm parity prices, grants and aids, ' 
and so forth, the pressure on our economy will evidently be in­
creased. That is, the problem of the "big domestic budget" is es­
sentially one of domestic public opinion. If the public wants a 
large volume of spending there will be a large budget; if the pub-
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lie does not want such spending the budget . will be small.. The 
point of this line of argument, of course, is that public opinion 
in a foreign country is exactly what ideological warfare seeks to 
influence. 
In conclusion let me say that the framework, the setting, 
the logics, and the position of economic warfare in the present . 
cold war between the United States and the Russians are quite 
different from the situation prevailing in either of the first two 
World Wars. This is what might be expected on a priori grounds. 
The whole geography of the situation is different and it seems 
virtually impossible to blockade the Russians.· The U. S. S. R. is 
not so highly industrialized a country as Germany and not so 
susceptible to shortages of food and raw materials. Nor is it so 
dependent on foreign commercial connections and foreign trade. 
Consequently it is distinctly less susceptible to offensive measures 
of economic warfare, at least of the traditional type, than was 
Germany. On the other hand, in view of our logistic and ideological 
position, we are more susceptible to offensive measures of economic 
warfare than we were heretofore. We are particularly vulnerable 
to types of operations that lend themselves to the Russians' abil­
ities. This country, at least this country together with her allies, 
is very dependent on an even flow of supplies. Our national in­
terest lies in the preservation of "normal" economic activity and 
economic and political stability. Our interest in such stability is 
more intense and will extend over a wider area than was the case 
before. As an industrialized, highly integrated, capitalistic na­
tion with a delicate and delicately balanced economy, we are 
particularly susceptible to the effects of strikes, sabotage, civil 
disturbance in colonial areas. Some of these areas are no further 
away than Latin America. Ideological warfare evidently has played 
and will play a larger part in the situation than it has before. Con­
sequently it seems ncessary that more of our efforts should be, and 
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will be, spent on defensive operations than on offensive operations 
designed to injure the Russian war potential directly. The Mar­
shall Plan is a case in point. 
Lest this should seem a pessimistic, unaggressive point of 
view, I may point out that few things can be so damaging to the 
Russian program, or at least large portions of it, as a failure on 
their part, because of the excellence of our economic defense, to ac­
complish the world wide proletarian revolution they have so con­
fidently predicted. They are in the position of having to validate 
.a prophecy. If the prophecy is not validated their ideological 
position is not likely to stand the disappointment. 
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